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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
BLANCHE ZOLLINGER MADSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DELBERT MURRAY MADSEN, 





It will be remembered by the Court that Appellant 
had filed her notice of appeal, taken her appeal, desig-
nated the record that she desired brought up from the 
lower court and presented her brief in this matter, and 
that thereafter Woodrow D. White and C. Preston Allen 
made a motion that the Court permit Respondent to file 
additional record on appeal under certain terms; that 
thereafter this additional record was filed. 
It will also be remembered Appellant was permitted 
to present arguments based on this additional record in 
either her reply brief or in a supplemental brief. 
In general we think the facts of the case have been 
duly presented in Appellant's statement of facts and in 
Respondent's statement of facts. But a brief history of 
the trial of the action which extended from April27, 1953, 
to December 7, 1953, would be helpful to the Court in 
determining this matter. 
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The trial of the action commenced at 10:00 o'clock 
a. m. April 27th, 1953. Appellant introduced her evidence 
in support of her complaint. The evidence showed that 
Appellant had $1900.00 in cash and bonds at the thne of 
her marriage ( AR 3); that defendant and respondent had 
land which he had valued at $1500.00 ( AR 5); that the 
parties owned a car ( AR 4); that the parties had certain 
household furniture ( AR 5, 6); that the defendant was 
working ( AR 13); that he had two jobs ( AR 14) with a 
take home pay from these two jobs of $280.26 per month 
( AR 41, 42, 43); and that he was getting $95.00 per month 
from the United States Government for partial disability 
( AR 15). That Appellant was not working ( AR 13). 
That while the Defendant was being cross-examined 
concerning his property at the continuation of the trial of 
the case, April 29, 1953, the Court took a recess. That 
after the recess the parties with their attorneys met in 
chambers and agreed to the following stipulation: 
"Mr. Perry: It's stipulated in open court between 
the parties and their attorneys and in their presence 
that if in any event the court sees fit to grant a 
divorce, he may award custody of the children to the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Madsen, and as a property and main-
tenance setttlement, the court may award the plain-
tiff, Mrs. Madsen, the sum of $1000 payable in six 
months; for the maintenance of the children, $30 
would be best each, wouldn't it? 
"Mr. Sjostrom: It wouldn't make any difference, 
I guess. 
"Mr. Perry: Thirty dollars each until how long? 
-4-
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"Mr. Sjostrom: Until further order of the court, 
and $150 attorney's fees. When does he commence 
paying alimo~y? The property settlement here will 
be in lieu of all other rights of the plaintiff, pur-
ported rights, in lieu of all alimony and other pro-
perty settlements. 
"'Mr. Perry: The defendant may have the Ply-
mouth automobile. 
"Mr. Sjostrom: That's right. 
"Mr. Perry: And the plaintiff may have the ... 
"Mr. Sjostrom: You mean the defendant may have 
the Pontiac automobile. 
"Mr. Perry: Yes, the defendant may have the 
automobile, and the plaintiff may have the furniture. 
'"Mr. Sjostrom: The defendant may have the lands 
in Washington County and St. George." (AR 98, 99). 
Part of this stipulation was reiterated in the hearing 
on the 15th day of July, 1953 (AR 5 to 8). 
After this stipulation the Appellant relied thereon 
and introduced no further evidence to assist the Court 
in determining the amount of alimony and support money 
to be paid. The case was then continued until July 15th, 
1953 ( R 25) when additional evidence was taken. On 
September 28th, 1953 ( R 25) the Court announced that 
Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment dissolving the bonds 
of matimony between Plaintiff and Defendant. That the 
parties should have joint custody of the children; that 
plaintiff should have them nine months and defendant 
three months out of each year and that the plaintiff was 
to be awarded $25.00 per month as support money for 
-5-
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each child. On October 13th ( R 25) the Court again 
took up the matter and said that the Plaintiff should be 
given one-half of the real property and household furni-
ture and defendant the car and that this award should be 
in lieu of her rights for alimony. That the custody of the 
two eldest children should be given to the defendant three 
months out of each year provided he made certain show-
ings. On December 7, 1953, the findings and decree 
were signed. 
As this case was before the Court for approximately 
seven months and as testimony was taken at various inter-
vals during that time and as defendant had personally 
contacted the Court (AR 2, 4, 7, 8 of hearing of July 15) 
we may excuse the Court for not remembering all that 
transpired when he finally signed the decree of divorce. 
But because the Court, in not remembering all the facts, 
erred in making its decision, this error should be corrected 
by the Appellate Court who now has a transcript of the 
record before it. 
POINT I 
THE PARTIES STIPULATED THAT PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD HAVE $1000 AND THE HOUSEHOLD FUR-
NITURE IN LIEU OF ALIMONY. THE COURT IS 
BOUND BY THIS STIPULATION. 
It is our contention that the court should be bound 
by the stipulation made by the parties. This position finds 
support in the following: 
"Stipulations made by the parties to a judicial pro-
ceeding, or by their attorneys, within the scope of 
-6-
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their authority, are binding upon those who make 
them, and those who they may lawfully represent, 
and upon trial and appellate courts." (50 Am. Jur. 
p. 610). 
A case very similar to the one at bar is Bloom v. Graff 
( Md. ) 63 A. 2d 313. In this action the plaintiff operated 
a package liquor store. The defendant's taxicab crashed 
into the store. The plaintiff sued for damages. During 
the course of the trial the attorney for the plaintiff stated 
in open court; 
"Your Honor please, before putting on my first wit-
ness I would like to state that it is stipulated and 
agreed between counsel for the parties to this case 
that if a verdict is found in favor of the plaintiff it 
should be in the amount of $896.09." 
No objection was made to this statement by the attorney 
for the defendant. After evidence of negligence had been 
introduced the Court instructed the jury that they did not 
have to bring in a verdict for $896.09. The jury rendered 
a verdict for the plaintiff and fixed the damages at $250.00 
and an appeal was taken. In modifying the lower court's 
decree the appellate court said: 
"Often in the trial of cases certain stipulations are 
made by counsel in order to save the time of the 
Court and the expense and difficulty of producing 
witnesses. Where such stipulation is agreed to by 
counsel an orderly trial of the case demands that the 
parties are bound there by. If the attorney for the 
defense did not agree to that stipulation made in 
open 'Court before the trial judge, he should have 
objected and so advised the court. Silence under 
such circumstances amounts to consent. .. 
-7-
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"As the liability of the appellees has been determined 
by the jury, there is no issue requiring a new trial. 
Judgment is therefore entered in this court for plain-
tiff and against the defendant for the sum of $896.09.') 
Two Utah cases have discussed this problem. In 
Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 68 Utah 30, 249 Pac. 121, 
the court said: : 
"In this connection it should be stated that Respon-
dent's counsel insist that the latter was not _guilty of 
driving the car at the time of his arrest, but assert that 
the same was driven by a lad about 13 years of age. 
They have set forth the evidence upon that subject 
and it supports their contention. We remark, a com-
plete answer to the foregoing contention is that it 
was stipulated at the hearing in the court below, and 
the stipulation appears in the record, that the res-
pondent was convicted of the offense of driving an 
automobile while intoxicated. Respondent is bound 
by that stipulation and so are we." 
In a more recent case, Richlands Irrigation Con1pany 
v. Westview Irrigation Company ( 1938) 96 Ut. 403, 80 
P. 2d 458, the state engineer had asked for an adjudication 
of water rights in Sevier River. There had been a former 
decree whereby the upper water users had agreed to per-
mit the waters to flow to lower reservoirs during the 
winter time. The Vermillion Irrigation Company did not 
agree to this decree so the other parties drew up a stipula-
tion with the Vermillion Company in which it was pro-
vided that the Vermillion Company should have 37.80 
c.f.s of the waters of the Sevier River accumulating be-
tween the Annabella and Vermillion dams, provided that 
whenever the water yielded between the two dams would 
-8-
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not be sufficient to supply the Vermillion Company with 
the 37.80 c.f.s., then the rights hereinbefore mentioned 
and set out under Section A shall prorate equally with 
the said Vermillion Canal Company. The trial court in 
interpreting this stipulation restricted the rights of the 
Vermillion Company to the waters that arose in the Sevier 
River between the two dams. An appeal was taken and 
the appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court 
giving a different interpretation to the stipulation and 
then saying: 
"Where parties litigant, instead of assembling wit-
nesses and putting on their proofs, reduce their res-
pective rights and priorities to writing and stipulate 
that a decree may be entered in conformity thereto, 
such contract if lawful has a binding effect on the 
decree that may be entered. It has all the binding 
effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law made 
by the court upon evidence, and more. A court may 
modify its findings in apt time but it cannot change 
or modify a contract of the parties. In the particulars 
pointed out, the court by its findings, conclusions and 
decree varied the provisions not in harmony there-
with. The contract of the parties amounted to a 
stipulation that all the facts necessary to support 
such contract and a decree in conformity thereto 
pre-existed and would be sustained by available evi-
dence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed 
with the taking of evidence. . . The agreement in 
writing is equal to an express court finding of facts 
to support the year-round water rights described 
therein." 
This is appellant's position in this matter. The parties 
having agreed on a fixed sum of $1000 plus the household 
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furniture in lieu of alimony and having agreed on $30.00 
per month for each child for support and maintenance, the 
lower court had no power to modify this agreement and 
where the conclusions of law or the decree varied from 
the stipulation, they must be set aside and a judgment en-
tered in accordance with the stipulations. 
While it may be true that there was some evidence in 
the record that the defendant was in poor health and that 
he did not always have regular employment and while it 
may also be true that there was a lack of evidence that 
appellant needed the $1000 and while it may be true that 
the property given to her was the equivalent of $1000 
(which we deny), the court is not concerned with evi-
dence that found its way into the record which may or 
may not support its decision. Such evidence and facts do 
not control the decision in this case. The decision should 
be based entirely upon the agreement made by the parties 
in open court. 
POINT II 
THE PARTIES LIKEWISE AGREED ON THE 
SUM OF $30 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT AND 
MAINTENANCE OF EACH CHILD. THE COURT IS 
LIKEWISE BOUND BY THIS STIPULATION. 
The same rule should hold with respect to the monthly 
allowance to plaintiff for the support of her three minor 
children, for it is stipulated that this sum should be $30 
per month and the court gave only $25 per month for each 
child. As this stipulation has not been set aside both 
parties should be bound by it. Plaintiff would like to 
-10-
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contend that $30 is an insufficient amount, but her hands 
are tied by the stipulation. In a like manner, the respon-
dent should be bound. 
Respondent further argues that plaintiff should be 
bound by the judgment of the court because "there is no 
affirmative evidence which would support appellant's 
position that a greater sum is necessary for the support and 
maintenance of the children" (Respondent's Brief, page 
7). We agree to this lack of evidence. When Respondent 
stipulated that he would pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$30 per month for the support of each child, Plaintiff relied 
on this stipulation and withheld her evidence as to the 
amount necessary for their support. Respondent cannot 
now take advantage of plaintiff's position. He led her to 
believe that he would pay $30 per month for each child. 
He cannot now complain that there is insufficient evidence 
to support such an award. His stipulation admitted that 
no evidence was necessary to prove the amount of the 
award. He cannot now complain. 
POINT III 
AS THE PARTIES AGREED ON THE CUSTODY 
OF THE CHILDREN THERE WAS NO NEED· OF 
LEAVING THIS MATTER OPEN FOR FURTHER 
HEARING, BUT A JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
STIPULATION. 
The rights of the custody of the children have like-
wise been fixed by stipulation and unless tlie stipulation 
is against public policy it should be upheld. The trial 
-11-
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Court in modify~g the stipulation does not take the view 
that the stipulation is against public policy, but it con-
tends that it would be against the interests of the father 
to give exclusive custody of the children to the mother. 
It is clear from the evidence that the parties agreed that 
plaintiff should have custody of the children and during 
the three vacation months of June, July, and August the 
father should have the right to take the children for a 
visit twice each summer for one week each time ( AR 100-
102). 
The record is not clear as to the duration of the visits 
during the non-vacation period. Mr. Sjostrom, attorney 
for Respondent inquires (AR 101): "And then, say if he 
comes up on short visits, would it be okeh with you Mrs. 
Madsen, that he take them a day or two out around this 
valley, to, say, a show or something like that?" To which 
Mrs. Madsen replied "Yes." 
As this part of the stipulation is not clear the appelate 
court should definitely fix the time and number of such 
non-vacation visits. 
Plaintiff does not think the father should be given any 
privileges of custody of the third child who is ill. This 
child should remain with the mother. Plaintiff likewise 
contends that frequent custody of the child for forty-eight 
hours at a time is detrimental to the interest of the chil-
dren who attain the age of 36 months. The time is too 
long. In fixing the time of the visits the Court should 
consider what is best for the child and not what is con-
venient for the father. 
-12-
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We cannot resist respondent's contention that the 
father should have visiting privileges for all his children. 
But those privileges should be conditioned on his prompt 
payment of the amount awarded for the maintenance of 
his children and for alimony. If he does not pay, the 
visiting privileges should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
We think the judgment of the trial court should be 
modified to comply with the stipulation of the parties. 
The plaintiff should be given $1000 and the household 
furniture in _lieu of alimony. The plaintiff should likewise 
be awarded the sum of $90 each month for the support 
and maintenance of her three children. Plaintiff should 
have custody of the children and the decree should be 
made final in that it should not contain a provision per-
mitting respondent to seek more liberal terms. The court 
should fix the times of defendant's visits. Such visits 
should be permitted only when defendant is not delin-
quent in payment of alimony and support money. These 
times should not be more than twice during vacation per-
iods of one week duration each and not more than once 
each month for defendant to take his children to a show 
or for a ride around Cache Valley. These are the terms 
the parties agreed upon and these should be the terms 
of the decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRY & PERRY 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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